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BOWSHER V. SYNAR: THE EMERGING
JUDICIALIZATION OF THE FISCt
William C. Banks*
Jeffrey D. Straussman**
INTRODUCTION
The budget process is one of the central edifices of modern government. Because
it is the mechanism which transforms demands for government action into public pur-
poses, the budget process has held a fascination for both researchers and former partic-
ipants in the process who, having left office, have put their reflections in print.' For
economists, budgeting represents one type of non-market resource allocation which may
stand to benefit from improved methods for the distribution of scarce resources. 2 Stu-
dents of public administration often have recommended changes in budget procedure
to enhance the performance of the process.' Political scientists view budgeting as a
decision-making process to be understood in terms of the forces that yield winners and
losers from the allocation of public resources.' Legal scholars sec the budget process as
a focal point for major constitutional tenets such as federalism, judicial review, and the
separation of powers. For the citizen, the budget process has become increasingly visible
both because of media coverage that results from political struggles over the distribution
of the public's money, and the resolution of the issue that has received the most attention
in the past several years — the federal deficit.
In theory, budgeting is like a three-person game. The major players in this game
include executive agencies that prepare budgets, a central agency that reviews agency
budget requests, and a legislature that actually appropriates funds. The game is well
scripted: agencies request funds to support their respective programs. Because the sum
of all agency requests invariably would be larger than the resources available to fund all
claims, the central budget office must review these requests with an eye toward fiscal
constraint. Thus, the budget office recommends cuts in agency requests and insures that
the chief executive's policy priorities are reflected in the agencies' budgets. Because the
legislature has the constitutional appropriations powers, it scrutinizes the executive bud-
t Copyright 0 1987 by Boston College Law School.
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; B.A., University of Nebraska, 1971;
ID., University of Denver, 1974; M.S., University of Denver, 1982.
** Professor of Public Administration, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University; B.A. Hofstra
University, 1966; M.A. Hunter College, 1969; Ph.D, Graduate School and University Center, City
University of New York, 1975.
1 See e.g., I). STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLITICS (1986).
2 See generally, C. SCHULTZE, FHE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SPENDING (1968).
'See A. WILDAVSKY, How TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT SPENDING (1980); 1-larriss, Control of Federal
Spending, 35 ACAD, POL. Sc'. PRoc. no. 4, 1 (1985). Program budgeting and zero-based budgeting
are two reforms that have been tried, and eventually abandoned at the federal level. For an
explanation of program budgeting, see Schick, The Road to PPB: Three Stages of Budget Reform, 26
Pus. ADMIN. REV. 243 (1966). For an explanation of zero-base budgeting, see Phyrr, The Zero-Base
Approach to Government Budgeting, 37 Pus. ADMIN. REv. 1 (1977). For a discussion of the problems
involved in implementing budget reforms, see Straussman, A Typology of Budgetary Environments, 11
ADMIN. & SOCIETY 216-26 (1979).
4 A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1984).
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get and sometimes alters it if, in the exercise of its oversight role, the legislature disagrees
with the chief executive's policy objectives as reflected in the budget.
This brief description of the budget process reifies a process that has evolved over
two centuries. The current budget process — not nearly so tidy as the above portrait
would have it—did not begin this way. Part I of this article will review briefly the origins
of our constitutional tradition of democratizing the budget process and of insulating
spending decisions from the executive's political influences. 5 Then this article will relate
the evolution of the federal budget process, which Congress enlisted to facilitate its
appropriations task, by noting the emergence of the executive as a key player in the
budget game.6
 Part I concludes by emphasizing that budgeting has been reformed to its
contemporary condition largely free from judicial intervention. As this article later
argues,7
 this reform is as it should be given the constitutional primacy of Congress in
fiscal !natters, and given the sharing of powers among the elected branches which is
permitted by the Constitution and separation of powers principles.
In Part II, this article will describe some fiscal developments in post-New Deal
governments that may foreshadow recent efforts at budget reform and a judicialization
of the fist.' Especially since the New Deal, courts have been asked to review local and
national spending decisions because of the conflicting characterizations of spending
allocation as either a government entitlement or an individual right. In reviewing claims
— ranging from inadequate conditions at prisons and hospitals, to segregated schools,
to summary denials of entitlements — the courts have entered decrees that effectively
have mandated new government spending. Arguably, regardless of the underlying rights
or entitlement claim's merits, the judicial decrees in these cases have usurped prerogatives
of the elected branches and often have revealed the courts' misunderstanding of the
budgeting process.
Some judicial forays into budgeting, however, do more damage than others. Those
decisions that simply affect budget outcomes are less disruptive and not as constitutionally
suspect as those which alter the roles played by participants in the budget process.
Unfortunately, the "least dangerous branch" LO has the potential to undermine democracy
and separation of powers unnecessarily when it intrusively examines political accom-
modations which concern how fiscal decisions are made. Indeed, the thesis of this article
is that courts should not assume an active role in reviewing political accommodations
concerning the allocation of budgeting tasks. Because, as Madison remarked, "the leg-
islative department alone has access to the pockets of the people ... ,"" federal courts
should respect the congressional means chosen for exercising fiscal powers and should
not overturn these means unless Congress clearly has usurped a coordinate branch's
power, or performed that branch's core function.
Parts HI, IV, and V support this thesis through an evaluation of Congress's most
recent response to burgeoning budget deficits — the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
5 See infra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
fi See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 224-71 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 65-87 and accompanying text.
The fisc represents the activities of government that involve the receipt and the spending of
the public's money.
10
 This description of the judiciary is from THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
" THE FEDERALIST No. 48 ( J. Madison).
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legislation 12 — and through a critique of the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Bowsher
v. Synar.' 5 In Bowsher, the Court invalidated important provisions of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act concerning the roles the participants play in the
budget process. This Act was a dramatic departure from past budgeting schemes — and
perhaps an ill-advised attempt at political buck-passing — but this departure should not
have led the Supreme Court to decide that the Act is unconstitutional. This article offers
two basic conclusions. First, the Court erred in deciding the constitutionality of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings because it based its decision on a never exercised provision that allows
congressional removal of the Comptroller General — an official assigned important
duties under the Act. The removal provision - is in a 1921 statute 14 and never contem-
plated consideration of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Thus, the Court undermined
congressionally assigned roles for the players in major budgeting legislation without
dealing with the real subject matter of the challenged Act. Second, the Court's decision
does damage to the separation of powers principles. The Court applied a wooden version
of the separation coinmands which simplified and supported its reliance on the removal
statute but which misstated the role that separation of powers plays under our Coinsti-
tution. A properly limited separation inquiry would have found neither an explicit
constitutional limit nor a usurpation of executive branch power in Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings. The legislation took nothing from the President that the Constitution assigned
to the executive branch.
The Bowsher decision is thus a disturbing illustration of this article's thesis: active
judicial intervention into the process of budgeting undermines the effective functioning
of government, democracy, and our separation of powers. The Court's Bowsher opinion
revealed the Court's superficial understanding of how the budget process works. Instead
of candidly conceding the judiciary's limited institutional capacity in this area, the Court
entered the fiscal thicket" and cut an important feature out of the Act without ever
coming to grips with the budgeting process prescribed in the Act.
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL BUDGETING
A. Early Congressional Primacy and the Birth of Shared Powers
In fashioning the new government, the Framers were keenly aware of the impor-
tance of specifying who controlled the nation's money. The British legacy provided
desirable lessons such as the well-known principle of no taxation without representation.
This idea evolved from the demand that the Money for the royal executive be authorized
by the legislature; eventually this became the lower house of the United States Congress. 16
On the other hand, the colonial governors' exercise of the taxing and spending powers
1 ' Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub, L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat.
1038 (codified at 2 U.S.G. § 901 (Supp. 111 1985)).
- U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the case.
" Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 19, 42 Stat. 20, 23-24 (codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 703(e)(1) (1982)).
This phrase is inspired by Justice Frankfurter's phrase, "political thicket," from Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
16 mosHER, THE GAO: THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 18-19
(1979).
662	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 28:659
then held by the King fanned the Americans' revolutionary flame.° The colonial expe-
rience provided an essential lesson: the fear of the executive power, when translated to
the power of the purse, required that such power rest with elected representatives in a
legislative body.'s The first state constitutions set the tone for the distrust of executive .
prerogatives over public funds by implementing measures to curb executive control:
independent officials and legislative committees were appointed to audit executive ac-
counts, and prohibitions against spending public funds without warrants signed by
legislative representatives were imposed. 19
The preconstitutional national government also implemented various devices for
insuring that fiscal decisions were reserved for legislators. At first, the Continental
Congress tried to perform all the functions of government. When it became apparent
that this was impossible, the Congress formed committees, named boards made up of
lay persons and, by 1781, appointed executive officials who assumed specialized admin-
istrative assignments. 20 In the same year, the Congress created the office of Superinten-
dent of Finance and replaced the existing Board of Treasury with a comptroller, a
treasurer, a register, auditors, and clerks. 21 Even then Congress sought to retain control
over the executive officials by prescribing statutory powers of appointment and by
making certain financial decisions of the comptroller final. 22
 After the Revolutionary
War ended, Congress returned to its prior Treasury Board System, and the Board
managed the nation's money until Hamilton became Secretary of the Treasury in 1789.23
While the Constitution clearly gave the power of the purse to the Congress, it made
no explicit statement concerning the estimate of future expenses or the supervision of
appropriations once made.24 At the Convention, the Framers rejected the Committee of
Detail's recommendation that one of Congress's enumerated powers should be "To
appoint a Treasurer by ballot."25
 While the Framers, in principle, may have approved
the idea that the supervision of the fisc is an executive function, the legislative constraints
on the Board of Treasury suggest that neither the Continental Congress nor the Framers
were willing to allow even post-enactment control over appropriations to become an
exclusively executive domain. 26
 Furthermore, the Framers were not entirely comfortable
with delegating the task of estimating the fisc to executive officials. Although the Framers
initially gave the task of budget estimation to the new Secretary of the Treasury, the
"7 Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
19 Id, at 20.
2° Fisher, The Administrative State: What's Next After Chadha and Bowsher? (paper presented at
American Political Sciences Association Meeting, Sept. 1986).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23
	 MOSIIER, supra note II, at 21. These influences on the Framers were translated into the
text of the Constitution. First, "WI Bills fur raising Revenue shall originate" in the House of
Representatives. U.S. CoNs•r. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Second, "[nit) Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of' Appropriations made by Law." Id. at § 9, cl. 7. Third, the Congress, having
been "vested" with "141 legislative Powers," id. at § 1, cl. 1, also was given explicit power "to lay
and collect Taxes ... to pay the Debts" id. at § 8, cl. 1, "No borrow money on the credit of the
United States," id. at § 8, cl. 2, and the "necessary and proper" clause power to enact legislation
appropriate for the exercise of any constitutional power. Id. at § 8, cl. 18.
24
 F. MOSHER, supra note II, at 22.
"Id. The Board of Treasury continued to supervise finances until 1789.
26 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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statutory obligations imposed on the Secretary 27 — and early skirmishes between Alex-
ander Hamilton and Congress — harmonize with the notion that the Framers intended
that Congress have a hand in both budget estimation and post-enactment supervision."'
Early executive branch involvement in the budget process consisted of Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton's active involvement in preparing revenue and ex-
penditure estimates and, more generally, in his personal style of executive financial
management."' While Hamilton's tenure generally has been interpreted in terms of
strong executive dominance, the creation of the Treasury Department in 1789 repre-
sented shared responsibility for the administration of the public fisc." For example, the
Departments of War and Foreign Affairs (now State) were created at the same time as
Treasury. While the former two explicitly were called executive departments, Treasury
was not." While Foreign Affairs and War statutes created only a Secretary and a Chief
Clerk, the Treasury Department's organic statute created a Secretary, a Comptroller, an
Auditor, a Treasurer, a Register, and an Assistant to the Secretary." The Secretary
appointed only the Assistant to the Secretary. In addition, while the statutes creating the
Foreign Affairs and War Departments directed the Secretaries to "perform and execute
such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the
President,"" the Act establishing the Department of the Treasury did not mention the
President. Instead, it directed the Secretary to prepare various reports for the Congress."
After Vice President. Adams cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate, the Secretary of the
Treasury was made removable by the President." In the event of removal, however,
Congress would cabin other Treasury officers through statutory obligations not unlike
those required of the current Comptroller General under the 1921 authorizing legisla-
tion."
The overall message is one of early shared responsibility for the fist's administration;
notwithstanding the subservient position of the Treasury Department to the President,
Congress would insulate some budgetary decisions from the executive branch, as well as
from political influences in general. In addition, any initial spurt or executive dominance
in budgeting, mainly attributable to Alexander Hamilton's tenure as Treasury Secretary,
soon ended with the development of the committee system in Congress." In particular,
once the House Committee on Ways and Means was established in 1802, it dominated
the budget process throughout the first half of the nineteenth century." Passing complex
appropriations — sufficiently detailed so as to circumscribe executive discretion and
thereby insure executive branch accountability — served to manage conflicts between
the executive and legislative branches. 39
27 See L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL. SPENDING POWER 12 (1975).
" See generally id, at 12-13.
26 See J. BURKHEAD, GOVERNMENT BUDGETING 9 (1959).
" See id.
21 L. FISHER, supra note 27, at 10-11.
32 F. BLUSHER, supra note 11, at 26.
33
 Id.
"Id.
33 Id. at 25.
36 See Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 312,42 Stat. 20,25-26.
37 See J. BURKHEAD, supra DOW '29, at 10.
3 ' See Id. at 10-11.
" F. MosiiEst, supra note 1 1, at 23.
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This early budgetary history is at odds with a textbook description of the separation
of powers doctrine which assumes a sharp demarcation of responsibilities. Such a notion
-- which assumes that separation requires a rigid delineation between the branches —
conflicts with a special legislative prerogative over the fisc as an evolved bedrock com-
ponent of democratic government. This conception of the separation of powers doctrine
is seriously undermined because the supervision of the fisc involves executive and,
perhaps, judicial functions. But as Parts IV and V posit, separation of powers was never
intended to confine the management of the fisc. The sharing of functions by the Board
of Treasury before 1787,. and the continuation of the sharing of powers after 1789
effectively were sanctioned in the Constitution. 4° The Constitution represented a confir-
mation of existing arrangements. The administrators were responsible for assisting the
Congress in estimating the expense of government and assuring that appropriations
were administered according to law; simultaneously, the Congress retained control over
the appropriations themselves, including supervision of officials active in the appropri-
ations process.
In fact, the shifting dominance of' the legislative and executive branches in the
Management of the public's money reflects the absence of a sharp constitutional demar-
cation of fiscal responsibilities. Congressional dominance of the budget process continued
throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century." If, in the evolution of budgeting,
the period was in any way remarkable, it was that the birth of the Appropriations
Committee in 1865 — and the subsequent growth of standing committees that took on
authorizing responsibilities — dispersed the congressional power of the purse. 42 During
this period, neither Congress nor executive branch departments were motivated pri-
marily by a concern for budget control — the effort to insure that department spending
be brought in line with continually revised revenue estimates. 45
Standard historical accounts of the federal budget process conclude that, if the
nineteenth century was evidenced by congressional dominance of the process, the twen-
tieth century reversed the pattern." This is, of course, an exaggeration. The Anti-
deficiency Acts of 1905-1906 45 represented a reaction to the lack of budget control. To
prevent overspending of appropriations, the Acts required department heads to prepare
expenditure plans:1 8 The Taft Administration initiated efforts to exert budget control.
Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency issued a report, The Need for a National
Budget, which established the intellectual groundwork for a strong executive budget
process. 47 After a hiatus during World War I, interest in budget control resumed and
culminated in the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. 48 While in the constitutional
challenge to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Budget and Accounting Act's recent prom-
inence has centered entirely on the removal issue surrounding the Comptroller General
of the United States, the Act is more properly thought of as a vehicle for modern
executive budgeting. In. particular, the 1921 Act created the Bureau of the Budget and
4° See j. BORKHEAD, supra note 29, at 10-11.
" See id. at 10.
' 2 See id. at 11.
45 See id. at 12.
44 See F. MOSHER, supra note 11, at 38-40.
' 5 Anti-Deficiency Act, Ch. 510, 34 Stat. 27 (1906).
40 Anti-Deficiency Act, ch. 610, § 3679, 34 Stat. 27, 49.
BURKHEAD, supra note 29, at 18-19.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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gave the Bureau responsibility for coordinating the President's budget. This coordinating
role would provide future presidents with a method for integrating the various spending
agencies' disparate budget requests with the programmatic and fiscal objectives of the
administration.'" Meanwhile, the newly created General Accounting Office (GAO) would
monitor the delegation of legislative powers of the purse. 5° The Comptroller General,
as head of the General Accounting Office, is charged with the responsibility of' investi-
gating "all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds
"51
. . . .
B. Strengthening the Executive in the Budget Process
The evolution toward a strong executive role in the budget process continued over
the next two decades, and became even stronger during World War I I and its aftermath.
The shift in the federal government's intervention in the economy, and the central place
the budget occupied in this shift, strongly affected the process's evolution. In particular,
President Roosevelt's New Deal, which initiated the government's countercyclical activi-
ties, included the adoption of a series of programs designed to maintain the purchasing
power of individuals in the face of economic downturns. With the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935," the federal government began an era wherein individuals are
granted entitlements in the form of guaranteed government benefits. The Social Security
Act established the basis for an expanded role for government, The Social Security Act
- and the new possibility of constitutional and statutory claims to government benefits
- paved the way for judicial intervention in the fist."
The original Social Security Act provided three major categorical grant programs:
old age assistance," aid to the blind,65 and aid to dependent children.56 Over the next
five decades, a number of amendments created additional benefits: the food stamp
program," black lung payments," supplemental security income, 59 and the medicare°
and medicaid programs. 1 i 1 In addition, some existing entitlement programs - Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, for example - were expanded substantially.° 2 The
" Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 207, 42 Stat. 20, 22.
"See 11. MANSFIELD, THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL: A STUDY IN TOE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
FINANCIAL. ADMINISTRATION 65 (1939),
51 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 312(a), 42 Stat. 20, 25.
52 The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
53 For a discussion of the evolution of constitutional claims to government entitlements, see
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LT 733 (1964).
" Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, ** 1-6, 49 Stat. 620, 620-22.
55 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, ** 1001-06, 49 Stat. 620, 645-47.
56 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, ** 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 127-29.
57 Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No, 88-525. 78 Stat. 703 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
** 2011-2029 (1982)).
58 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (codified
as amended at 30 U.S.C. ** 901-1945 (1982)).
56 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 7, 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
66 Health Insurance for the Aged Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-07, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
61 Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs Act of' 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat.
343 (as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982)).
62 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 627.
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expansion of entitlement spending exemplified the federal government's major com-
mitment to provide cash and in-kind benefits to large segments of the population; it was
not until the 1970's that the fiscal ramifications of the expansion's cumulative effect
became a major political issue." Nevertheless, entitlements represent two historically
important threads in the budget process. First, entitlement programs played an impor-
tant role in changing the character of the federal budget. Second, entitlements provided
a basis for the first significant judicial activity with budgetary consequences.
H. AN EMERGING JUDIGIALIZATION OF THE FISC
The courts did not play a significant role in the history of the budget process
described up to this point. The fact that the judicial branch has no constitutionally
delineated role in the budget process accounts for this absence. In addition, the budget
process, as it has evolved over many decades, had not found an overt place for the
judicial branch in the formulation and implementation of budget policies 64
 This absence
of judicial involvement with the fist, however, has changed in recent years.
A. Entitlement Programs and Hearing Rights
Entitlement programs have provided one avenue for judicial intervention in the fist.
By the early 1960's, a line of reasoning emerged which asserted that government benefits
are so essential to the recipients' well-being that the benefits represent a new form of
property and, therefore, should receive constitutional protection." In 1970 the Supreme
Court accepted this theory in the decision of Goldberg v. Kelly. 66 The Goldberg Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right to a fair hearing before public
assistance benefits could be terminated 67 While the Goldberg Court did not consider the
budgetary consequences of its decision, it is reasonable to assume that increased spending
for public assistance is one result of the decision. 68
 The Supreme Court's 1976 decision
Mathews v. Elridge, 69 however, recognized that not all entitlement benefits were equal
and, thus, tempered the Goldberg holding. 7° Mathews established the principle that social
costs must be balanced against the claims of the beneficiaries.'] Both these cases are
notable as "back door" judicial involvement in fiscal matters.
B. Institutional Reform Litigation
Institutional reform litigation is another area in which judicial decisions have influ-
enced government spending. Decisions mandating minimum cell space, right to treat-
ment, and adequate medical care, for example, have required increased state government
6' See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
64 See Matthews v. De Castro, 429 U.S 181, 185 (1976).
65 See Reich, supra note 53, at 733.
66 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
1'7 Id. at 266-71.
" See e.g., J. MASHAW 8c R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
193-94 (2d ed. 1985). The hearing process delays termination for some percentage of beneficiaries.
Thus, in the aggregate, spending probably is higher than it would be otherwise in the absence of
the due process protection. See id.
6° 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
7° Id. at 340-43.
Id. at 347-49.
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spending.72 One study which examined the impact of overcrowding cases on state spend-
ing showed that in the five years following the initial judicial decisions, capital expen-
ditures increased." Similarly, judicial school desegregation decisions have influenced
state and local spending. 74 It is difficult to locate firm estimates of the budgetary costs
required by the desegregation orders. But while precise and reliable estimates of state
and local spending attributable to court decisions is unavailable, criticism of judicial
interference with executive and legislative prerogatives deserve some attention: it serves
to forewarn of the dangers created by the courts' active role in the budget process.
Initially, criticism directed at the exercise of judicial power in institutional cases seem
self-evident." Judicial orders to spend necessarily involve the courts in making decisions
constitutionally entrusted to elected officials. Indeed, critics of the so-called "imperial
judiciary" base some of their criticisms on what they perceive to be illegitimate judicial
encroachments on legislative or executive powers." According to this view, finding
constitutional rights violations is not a sufficient reason for judicial action of the type
and magnitude inherent to the institutional cases." Because only the elected branches
constitutionally may raise and spend funds, excessive judicial activity in the institutional
cases illustrates the judicial power of the purse.
Because some expenditures are earmarked for a particular program, specific judi-
cially mandated services force the legislature either to raise revenues needed to finance
the court-ordered spending, or to reallocate planned expenditures." This alleged usur-
pation of legislative and executive budgetary authority makes institutional cases unique.
By implication, institutional suits fundamentally alter the budget process in states where
defense of such a suit has been unsuccessful.
Although institutional cases were once novel, from a budgetary standpoint their
novelty is somewhat circumscribed: the executive and legislative branches have always
experienced periodic "shocks" to the system — exigent circumstances that required
specific spending and thereby narrowed options. An obvious example . is the budgetary
requirements needed during a period when the nation is at war. The courts must
" See Frug, The judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 718-30 (1978). See also e.g.,
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (required to give inmates a minimum
amount of square feet of living space); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp, 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reversed in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (persons civilly committed to state mental institutions have a constitutional
right to treatment); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (N.D. Ohio, 1974) (mental institutions
which commit patients have a responsibility to treat the patients, until the patients regain their
sanity). See L. Harriman & J. Straussman, Do Judges Determine Budget Decisions? Federal Court Decisions
in Prison Reform and State Spending for Corrections, 43 Pus. ADMIN. REV. 343 (1983).
" See L. Harriman & J. Straussman, supra note 73, at 343-51 (1983).
74 See Frug, supra note 73,' at 762-67.
75 Gerald Frug has stated, "[L]f the courts were to have plenary power to define constitutional
values, command sufficient appropriations to support those values, and then control by equitable
decree the spending of the money appropriated, they would be exercising all power of government
judicial, legislative, and executive. Such a concentration of power was never contemplated by
the Constitution." Frug, supra note 73, at 733.
" "Mhe court orders involve a subject matter that is the very foundation or the discretion
lodged in the other branches: the raising, allocation, and spending of governmental funds." Id. at
735.
77 Id. at 736.
78 See id. at 741.
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appreciate the legislature's dilemma that competing demands are always going to be
greater than available resources. As Professor Frug points out:
Judicial requirements of expenditures must, in short, meet the test of feasi-
bility, and feasibility is in the first instance a legislative judgment, subject to
the requirement that the legislature's attempt to meet the constitutional
standard is in good faith. If the courts allow the legislature this time to
comply, interference with democratic decisionmaking will be minimized to
the point that judicial confrontations with legislative power will become
unlikely. 79
The recent history of institutional cases suggests that legislatures have adopted this view,
for it follows naturally from the resource constraints all governments face. 8°
C. School Finance Litigation
Several suits have alleged that the unequal financial condition of school districts
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 ' The federal and state
school finance cases have had mixed outcomes." Nevertheless, taken together, the school
finance cases can be distinguished from the institutional cases in terms of their ramifi-
cations for the budget process. On the surface, both institutional reform and school
finance cases affect the targeted states' budget process. The institution cases probably
have caused increased state spending." Similarly, in at least one school finance case," a
court's ruling — concerning the unconstitutional nature of the state financing for public
education — altered the state's revenue mix." Both cases stimulated the state legislature
to act in ways that it probably would not have acted in the absence of litigation.
Underlying these surface similarities, however, from the budget process standpoint,
the institution cases and the school finance decisions are not substantially the same. In
the institutional reform cases, administrators retained latitude to implement decisions so
that administrative discretion was preserved. In the school financing context, however,
only a limited number of revenue options that will satisfy the court decisions are available
to the state legislature: essentially the income tax and the state sales tax. 86
 Moreover, the
legislature cannot cut spending in other parts of state government. While a legislature
79
 Id. at 789.
88
 For a review of institution cases and their fiscal ramifications, see Straussman, Courts and
Public Purse Strings: Have Portraits of Budgeting Missed Something? 46 Pua. AnntrN. REV. 345,345-51
(1986).
81 See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (requirement of bona fide legal residence in a
school district, before reception of a free public education, did not violate the constitutional right
of interstate migration); Myer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (exclusion of undocumented children
from free public education violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Texas system of financing public
education through local property taxes was not violative of the equal protection clause).
82 These cases confirm what has been called "interjurisdictional equity" — fiscal treatment
among governments. See D. Rubinfeld,Judicial Approaches to Local Public Sector Equity: An Economic
Analysis, 542-76, in P. MIESZKOWSKI & M. STRASZHEIM, CURRENT ISSUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS (1979).
Ss Frug, supra note 73, at 727-28.
" Robinson v. Cahill, I I8 N.J. Super. 223,287 A.2d 187 (1972).
85
 For a history of the Robinson case, see generally R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (1978).
86 Other revenue sources, such as state lottery proceeds earmarked for public education, simply
do not yield adequate revenues.
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responding to prison overcrowding can resort to mechanisms such as early parole,
analagous options do not exist in the school finance cases. 87 In other words, judicial
involvement in school finance comes much closer to the source of legislative responsibility
than does the mandating of services to alleviate unconstitutional conditions in state
institutions. In the state institution cases, executive and legislative prerogatives are not
unalterably affected.
In sum, judicial decisions influence budget outcomes. The court decisions have a
significant impact on the roles participants play in the budget process. Because these
roles have evolved over a long period of time — and are instrumental in providing
budgeting with its stability and predictability judicial "intrusions" could upset this
delicate governmental balance. At root is the impact of the fisc's judicialization on
democracy and the separation of powers. It is surely debatable whether judicial "en-
croachments" in the institutional cases or judicial interference in school financing con-
stitute a judicial intrusion into the responsibilities of the other branches. In any event,
it is a categorically greater intrusion into the constitutionally assigned powers of the
purse to reorder judicially the process of budgeting. To appreciate the significance of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Bowsher decision in light of the threatened judicial
usurpation of fiscal powers, it is instructive to review briefly the budgetary history that
gave rise to the legislation in the first place.
III. DEFICITS AND CONGRESS
The decade of the 1970's was a bundle of contradictions from the vantage point of
budgetary history. The decade began with a series of budget process frustrations. These
frustrations included the growing inability of Congress to complete appropriations ac-
tions on time, 99 an increasing amount of "backdoor" spending that did not go through
the normal appropriations process, 99 the inability to evaluate the budget from the vantage
point of broad political and economic objectives 90 and, perhaps most importantly, the
belief that the excessive use of presidential impoundments strained the constitutional
framework of the budget process."' These frustrations led to the enactment of the Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 92
The 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act was passed overwhelmingly in
Congress, but it represented different things to different supporters of the legislation.
Some supporters saw the Act as a way of reasserting congressional influence in the
budget making process by establishing Budget Committees in both the House and the
Senate that would evaluate the budget "as a whole." Other supporters viewed the Act as
a means of curtailing the President's ability to impound congressionally appropriated
funds and as providing Congress access to budgetary expertise by creating the Congres-
sional Budget Office to provide professional assessment independent from the executive
branch. While the Act's supporters welcomed the reassertion of congressional influence
ar Frug, supra note 73, at 728-30.
99 See . . SuNnwis. r, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 211 (1981).
99 See 1). IPPOLITO, CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING '25 (1981).
9" See Ullman, Federal Spending and the Budget Crisis, 35 AGAR. Pot.. Sci. PRoc. no, 4, 38, 41
(1985).
91 See A. SCHICK, CONGRESS AND MONEY 45-48 (1980).
92 Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 332 (codified
at scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (1982)).
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in the budget process as a laudable achievement in itself," others thought that the test
of the Act's effectiveness would be the ability of Congress to use its rejuvenated influence
to curtail deficit spending. Those who held this expectation were to be disappointed."
Federal budget deficits did not become a major political issue in Congress until the
later 1970's. One reason for Congress's increased political concern over the budget deficit
was its size, whether measured in current dollars, constant dollars, or as a percentage of
gross national product (GNP)." For example, the deficit as a percentage of GNP —
which is perhaps its best measure — went from 3 percent in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1982
before dropping to 4.5 percent in 1985. 96
The composition of the federal budget was also changing. The defense share de-
clined during the 1970's as entitlement spending as a percentage of the total budget
increased sharply. 97 Much of the budget was effectively outside the appropriations com-
mittees' annual review. Procedural changes brought about by the Budget Control and
Impoundment Act of 1974 provided Congress the ability to evaluate budgetary trends.
These procedural changes, however, had no impact on the size of the budget, or on the
size of the deficit." One can interpret the congressional groundswell which produced
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, therefore, as the collective frustration of Congress over the
deficit impasses. With deficits mounting — and increased partisan wrangling over the
budgetary ramifications of President Reagan's decision to both cut domestic spending
and increase defense spending — Congress turned, in the fall of 1985, to Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings as the mechanism that would do what all else had failed to do.
IV. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS AND THE BOWSHER DECISLON
A. The Statutory Framework of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is a deceptively simple piece of legislation. The legisla-
tion's objective of eliminating the federal deficit is specified as a six year phaseout with
. the following deficit reduction targets:
1986	 $171.9 billion
1987	 144.0 billion
1988	 108.0 billion
1989	 72.0 billion
1990	 36.0 billion
1991	 0
These targets represent the maximum deficit allowable for the respective years. 99 Part
A of the Act prevents Congress from considering specific appropriations bills or overall
93 See A. Scrum CONGRESS AND MONEY, .supra note 91, at 71-72.
' A. SCHICK, CRISIS IN THE BUDGET PROCESS 7-8 (1986).
"5 /d. at 5.
9' See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF Tin.: PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, HISTORICAL
TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1987, Table 14.6.
97 Schick, The First Five Years of Congressional Budgeting, in THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
AFTER FIVE YEARS '25-26 (R. Penner ed. 1981).
9' For a review of the federal budget's history since the passage of the 1974 Act, see L. Fisher,
Ten Years of the Budget Act: Still Searching for Controls, 5 Pun. BUDG. & Fix. 3 (1985).
99 Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 201, 99 Stat. 1038, 1039-40.
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budget resolutions that would surpass the maximum deficit prescribed for that year.w°
Similarly, Part B requires that the annual budget submitted by the executive branch be
within the targeted deficit amounts.'"
If Parts A and B fail to produce the prescribed declining deficits, Part C of the Act
becomes operative. 102 Under Part C, if the projected deficit in each fiscal year exceeds
the target, automatic spending cuts are triggered that reduce total spending to the
prescribed deficit amount.'" Thus, projecting the deficit becomes the critical task under
the automatic spending cut mechanism in the Act. To assure that deficit projections be
performed in an unbiased manner as possible, Congress named three offices to share
the task: the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), and the General Accounting Office (GAO). 01 To assure that its wishes were
effectively carried out, Congress specified, in careful detail, how the projections are to
be made."15
The Act establishes that if the deficit target is not met, budget reductions must be
determined on a program by program basis. Most programs become subject to uniform,
across-the-board percentage reduction. 1 U6 Half of the needed reduction must come from
defense and nondefense programs respectively. 107 Some programs, such as Medicare,
are subject to limited reduction;'" other entitlement programs are exempted from the
cuts.' 09
In order to assess the constitutional challenge to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in
Bowsher, it is necessary to describe in some detail the particular roles the CBO, OMB,
and GAO play in estimating the deficit and program-cutting requests. The Act originated
in the Senate, in a form which gave the reporting functions to the OMB and C130."°
Because many House members objected to potential presidential influence on the cuts
through the OMB, they proposed the resulting GAO.'" The proposed GAO role was
to wall out the President's political influence and to take "these decisions out of the
hands of the President and the Congress."" 2 Congress felt that the GAO was effectively
an independent body. A contemporaneous report affirming the status of the GAO as an
independent agency supported this conclusion.' L9 Indeed, throughout consideration of
the Act and its passage, not one of the Act's opponents questioned either the constitu-
tionality of the GAO role, or the conclusion that the GAO role effectively would fence
the Congress out of the reporting process.'"
LOU pub. L. No. 99-177, §§ '201-32, 99 Stat. 1038, 1039-62.
" Pub. L. No. 99-177, §.§ 241-42, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063.
"Pub. L. No. 99-177, §§ 251-57, 99 Stat, 1038, 1063-93.
'"' Pub. L. No. 99-177, 251, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-72.
104 Id.
'US Pub. L. No. 99-177, §§251(a)(5)-(6), 255-57, 99 Stat. 1038, 1067-68, 1082-93.
"a Pub. L. No. 99.177, § 251(a)(3)(B)-(C), 99 Stat. 1038, 1064-65.
127 Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(a)(3)(B), 99 Stat. 1038.
i" Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 256, 99 Stat. 1038, 1086-92.
1 "9 Pub. L. No. 99-177, * 255, 99 Stitt. 1038, 1082-86.
l to See 131 CONG. REC. S12, 082 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1985) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
"l See 131 CONG. REc, 514, 924 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985).
112 131 CONG. Rtc. H9846 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985) (statement of Rep. Gephardt).
" 3 See CONG. Rix. 119846 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985); HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, THE
PRESIDENT'S SUSPENSION OF THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, H.R.
REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., lit Sess. 8-13 (1985).
114
 See, e.g., 131 CONG. REC. S17, 404-06 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1985) (statement of Sen. Glenn);
id. at H11, 888 (statement of Rep. Conk); id. at 1111, 879.
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Except for special rules regarding the already passed fiscal year 1986 ,115 the deficit
reduction process begins with a joint OMB/CBO report issued in August that estimates
the deficit for the next fiscal year. 16 The key elements of the joint report are its estimates'
of economic growth and its determination that the deficit will or will not be more than
$10 billion in excess of the prescribed maximum level.'" If the OMB and CBO are
unable to agree on common estimates, their estimates are averaged.'" Their joint report
also estimates - for each nondefense account and for each defense program, project,
and activity - the base from which reductions are to be taken and the dollars and
percentages by which reductions are to be made to lower the estimated deficit to the
required leve1. 119
The OMB/CBO report must be submitted to the GAO on August 20th. 129 By August
25th, the Comptroller General "shall review and consider" the joint report and, "with
due regard for the data, assumptions and methodologies" must issue a report to the
President identifying the excess deficit. If the deficit exceeds the target by more than
$10 billion, the Comptroller General must specify the base from which reductions are
to be made and the dollars and percentage reduction in each account. 12 ' The Comptroller
General's report "shall be based on the estimates, determinations, and specifications" 122
of the OMB and CBO, and the report must use the same assumed budget base, criteria,
and guidelines which the OMB and CBO used in their report.'" Finally, the Comptroller
General's report "shall explain fully any differences"'" between it and the joint OMB/
CBO report.
If the Comptroller General's report to the President identifies an excess deficit, the
Act requires that the President issue an order by September 1 that eliminates the excess
deficit and conforms with the Act's above described sequestration requirements."' Except
for some defense reductions in 1986, 126 the Act gives the President no discretion to
modify the estimates or determinations of the Comptroller General's report.'" Then a
forty-five day period begins in which Congress may pass measures to alter the deficit. 129
The amounts sequestered by the September 1 order are withheld from obligation but
are not finally sequestered until October lst.' 29 Thereafter, a second round of OMB/
CBO and Comptroller General reports to the President may result in the issuance of a
final sequestration order on October 15 which implements changes in needed reductions
" 5 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Act of 1985, Pub. L. No 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat.
1038, 1063-72.
' 1 " See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(a)(1)-(2), 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-64.
" 7 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(a)(3), 99 Stat. 1038, 1064-66.
"I' See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(a)(5), 99 Stat. 1038, 1069.
119 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(a)(1)-(6), 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-68.
125 See Pub. L. No. 99.177, § 251(a)(2), 99 Stat. 1038, 1064.
121 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(b)(1), 99 Stat. 1038, 1068.
122 Id.
12 ' See id.
121 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251(b)(2), 99 Stat. 1038, 1068.
125 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(1), 99 Stat. 1038, 1072-73.
126 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(2), 99 Stat. 1038, 1073-74.
127 See Pub. L. No, 99.177, § 252(a)(3), 99 Stat. 1038, 1074.
128 See Pub. L. No. 99.177, § 251(c), 99 Stat. 1038, 1068-69.
129 See Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252(a)(6)(B), 99 Stat. 1038, 1075.
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by taking into account legislation enacted and regulations promulgated after submission
of the August report.'"
B. Bowsher v. Synar
Although President Reagan had supported the Act throughout its consideration in
Congress, his subsequent signing statement questioned the GAO role.' 31 A challenge to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings came within hours of the President's signing statement.' 32
The congressional plaintiffs, some who had voted against the Act, and union plaintiffs
— which had lost cost-of-living benefit increases as a result of the automatic deficit
reduction process — argued that the Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers
to the GAO.'" The plaintiffs further alleged that the exercise of "executive powers" by
the Comptroller General, an official removable by the Congress, violated constitutional
separation of powers.'" A three-judge district court, in an opinion written by now justice
Scalia, sustained the delegation of power' 35 but agreed with the plaintiffs that
since the powers conferred upon the Comptroller General as part of the
automatic deficit reduction process are executive powers, which cannot con-
stitutionally be exercised by an officer removable by Congress, those powers
cannot be exercised and therefore the automatic deficit reduction process to
which they are central cannot be implemented.'"
Upon direct review,'" the Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision,'" although
the majority declined to decide the delegation question.'" The Court adopted Judge
Scalia's reasoning concerning the removal provision. Accepting separation of powers as
the playing field,'" Chief justice Burger did not focus on whether the Comptroller
1 S° See Pub. L. No. 99.177, § 252(b)(1), 99 Stat. 1038, 1077.
131 While the House of Representatives considered the bill, the Director of the OMB stated that
the President strongly supported it and that the existing reservations concerned the role of the
CBO, not the GAO. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: Hearing Before a
Subcoutot. of the Hou.se Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, 100-102 (Oct. 17, 1985);
President's Statement on Signing H.J. Res, 372 Into Law, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1490, 1491
(Dec. 12, 1985).
132 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, _U.S.
_, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
188 See id. at 1377. The plaintiffs contended that the Act's delegation to the GAO of the power
to make the economic calculations that determine the estimated deficit and the resultant required
budget cuts violates the constitutional provision vesting "all legislative power" in the Congress. See
U.S. CONEY. art. I, § I.
04 See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Stipp. at 1377.
133 See id. at 1391.
0" Id. at 1403.
132 The Act provides that any order of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia which is issued pursuant to an action brought under section 274(01)-(3) of the Act, is
reviewable by direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(b), 99
Stat. 1038, 1098-99.
" 8
 Bowsher v. Synar, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3199 (1986).
139 See id. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3193 11.10.
"" See id. at ..._, 106 S. Ct. at 3184. Chief justice Burger stated: "The question presented	 is
whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain
functions under the ... Act ... violates the doctrine of separation of powers." Id.
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General's powers under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had the Congress performing a task
more properly reserved for the executive or had the Congress usurping an executive
power vested under the Constitution."' Rather, the separation of powers inquiry focused
on whether a never exercised provision in a 1921 statute, which permitted Congress to
remove the Comptroller General, violated the Constitution by creating a "here-and-now
subservience" 142
 of the Comptroller General to the Congress in his exercise of "executive"
duties under the Act." 5
To answer that question, the Chief Justice returned to the syllogistic reasoning
which supported his 1983 opinion for the Court in Immigration & Naturalization Service
v. Chadha. 14
 The Chief Justice's major premise was that the Constitution permits neither
Congress nor its agents to exercise executive power. The syllogism's minor premise was
that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings vests executive power in the Comptroller General who is
an agent of Congress. The Bowsher Court, therefore, concluded that Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings was unconstitutional. Like the opinion for the Court in Chad ha, such a simplistic
approach to the Bowsher challenge is internally flawed and obscures the more meaningful
inquiry which a separation of powers challenge merits. 15 The following section critiques
Chief justice Burger's syllogism.
1. Major premise: The Constitution permits neither Congress nor its agents to
exercise executive power.
According to the former Chief Justice, "Mlle Constitution does not contemplate an
active role for Congress in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the
law it enacts .... A direct congressional role in the removal of officers charged with the
execution of the laws beyond [impeachment) ... is inconsistent with separation of pow-
ers." 16 In other words, the power to remove officials who perform executive tasks
"would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws
.... The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws; it
follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not
possess." 147
The majority first found support for its general denial of congressional power to
execute the laws in the oft-quoted paraphrasing of Montesquieu from Madison in Fed-
eralist 47: "'there can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united
14 ' We later argue that such an inquiry would be proper for the court to have undertaken in
Bowsher. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
15 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. at 1392.
143 Bowsher _U.S. at	 106 S. Ct. at 3188-89.
144 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha concerned the constitutionality of a one house legislative veto
which had been exercised to reverse an administrative decision to suspend an alien's deportation
order. Id. at 923. Chief Justice Burger decided the constitutionality of the legislative veto device by
first stating the truism that all "legislation must comply with the presentment and bicameralism
requirements of Article L" then asserted simply that the veto constituted "legislation" because it
altered rights of persons outside the legislative branch, and concluded that the veto violated the
Article I requirement. See id. at 952.
' 45 The Chadha decision has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Symposium, Reactions to Chadha:
Separation of Powers and the Legislative Veto, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (1984); Spann, Deconstructing
the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984); Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment
on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L. REv. 789.
"5 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3187.
147 Id. at _ 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
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in the same person, or body of magistrates' ... .""g Thus, according to the Court,
separation of powers and its system of checks and balances "were the foundation of a
structure of government that would protect liberty." 19 Second, the Court reasoned that
the checking and separation which the Framers intended to protect liberty manifested
themselves in the system the Constitution established for administering government. 1"
The Constitution provides that Congress legislates to create offices and officers and the
President then appoints "Officers of the United States" with "the Advice and Consent
of the Senate."15 1 The Bowsher Court Found that because the only role mentioned in the
Constitution for Congress after confirmation is impeachment, any additional role "is
inconsistent with separation of powers." 152 Third, the Court cemented its major premise
by reference to the so-called "Decision of 1789." 1 " In 1789, the First Congress debated
and eventually rejected a congressional role in the removal process as inconsistent with
the Constitution. 154 Finally, Chief Justice Burger cited his Chadha opinion and found
that by removing or threatening to remove the Comptroller General, the Congress could
in effect veto the execution of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.'" According to the Bowsher
Court, such a veto, like the one house veto at issue in Chadha, would be lawmaking in
violation of the presentment and bicameralism requirements of Article I of the Consti-
tution. 15°
Chief Justice Burger's assessment of the role Congress has in our system of sepa-
ration of powers is a caricature, an exaggeration which bears little resemblance to how
the federal government works. Over a 200 year period the President has become active
in supervising the passage of legislation, and he unilaterally makes law by issuing Ex-
ecutive orders and proclamations. None of these "legislative" roles for the chief executive
are contemplated in the Constitution. Further, while Congress itself does not execute
laws, for the same 200 years it has engaged in oversight or supervision of agency affairs,
regardless of the agency's status as independent or constituent of the executive branch.
In addition, the Court's idealized conception of the legislative role fails to acknowledge
the real control Congress maintains over execution of its laws through hearings, inves-
tigations, appropriations, subpoena, and contempt power, as well as through the day-to-
day informal, nonstatutory controls arising from contacts between Members of Congress
and appointed officials. 157
Moreover, the philosophical parents of contemporary separation of powers ideals
did not envision a purist model. Chief Justice Burger's quotation from the Federalist is
misleading.Lm In the Federalist No. 47, Madison reasoned that Montesquieu meant no
more than: "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
148 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke, ed. 1961)).
145 Id.
' 5" Id. at _, 106 S. C. at 3186-87.
151
 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
152 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3187.
L"
154 Id.
155 Bowsher, _U.S. at __, 106 S. Ct. at 3189-92.
'56 Id.
'" See generally L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL. CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 'rHE PRESIDENT
(1985).
15 " See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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free constitution are subverted."'" Justice Jackson's formulation in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co, v. Sawyer'°° better captures the separation principle. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Jackson reasoned that: "[w] -tile the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into
a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." 161
Next, the Bowsher majority's reliance on the "Decision of 1789" and the Court's
construction of Article II are also wide of the mark. First, we accept many things which
were not contemplated in the Constitution as being harmonious with our constitutional
concepts. Second, Chief Justice Burger has once again earned low marks as a legal
historian. 162 As section I of this article revealed, the "Decision of 1789" was far more
complex than portrayed by the Chief Justice. 163 The "Decision of 1789" concerned the
Treasury Department as well as Departments of War and Foreign Affairs: The Decision
had its own history which included extensive legislative supervision of the administration
of the fist — a legislative role unique to questions of finance. In addition, the debates
concerning the removal power themselves were far more contentious — and the out-
comes far less predictable — than the Chief Justice implies. A statutory ban on removing
the Secretary of Treasury by the President was defeated only after the Vice President
broke a tie vote in the Senate.'" Moreover, when the debate turned to the Comptroller,
Madison, who argued effectively in favor of the President's power of removal of the
department heads, stated that because the office was not "purely of an Executive nature
.. there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not hold his office at
the pleasure" 166 of the President. Thus Madison, unlike Chief Justice Burger, demon-
strated an understanding of the then recent history concerning the role of the Comp-
troller during the Continental Congress and the general concern of the people in
insulating fiscal decision making from executive perogatives.
Perhaps the best evidence of the majority's mischaracterization of congressional
power is the Constitution itself and the shared legislative-executive arrangements which
it promotes. As will be more fully developed in the last part of this article, both separation
and its checking arrangements contemplate congressional supervision of executive offi-
cials. 166 In 1787, the implicit approval of the executive removal power was intended to
unify and strengthen the newly created executive brand -1.' 62 From the beginning, how-
ever, Congress has had the power to participate effectively in and condition removal
decisions through various means. Congress's sole power to create offices and attach
statutory constraints on them illustrates this power.' 66 Congress may remove an officer
by simply abolishing the office or by statutorily reducing or eliminating the term of
169
 TUE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961).
16G 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ( Jackson, J. concurring).
' 0 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
1 n See Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Power Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. HEY. 715,
717 (1984).
I"See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
164 See L. FISHER, supra note 157, at 65.
165
 ANNALS OF CONC. 611-12 ( J. Gales ed. 1789).
' 66
 See infra notes 224-64 and accompanying text.
167 See L. FISHER, supra note 157, at 94.
168 See id. at 94-95.
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office.' 69 Indeed, the theoretical responsibility of the President for management of the
executive branch is no more realistic today than is the notion that only Congress engages
in lawmaking. The sheer size of the bureaucracy and the decisions by Congress to vest
decision making powers in a wide range of subordinate government entities have op-
erated to shrink considerably presidential removal power,"" at no cost to the separation
of powers. At least since the Court's Madison v. Marbury 171 decision in 1803, the doctrine
that Congress may compel subordinate executive officials to carry out its wishes notwith-
standing objections by the President has been well established.' 12 The President is obli-
gated to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed .. . "175 If Congress makes an
independent officer's judgment conclusive on any matter which does not otherwise usurp
Article II power, the President has no role to play once the officer passes judgment.' 74
It is astonishing that none of the nine members of the United States Supreme Court
would challenge the quixotic portrait of government enshrined by the majority opinion.
Nonetheless, it is possible to accept an antiquated view of separation of powers and find
fault with both parts of the critical minor premise.
2. Minor premise (part one): Under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress vested
executive power in the Comptroller General.
Perhaps the best that may be said of the argument that the Comptroller General
possesses executive power under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is: so what? If true, the
argument does nothing to advance the proper inquiry into the constitutionality of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The minor premise is simply an assertion which calls for an
abstract characterization of what a government official does. To label the Comptroller
General's duties under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as "executive," or "judicial," or "leg-
islative" does not begin to answer the question whether Congress has violated the sepa-
ration of powers in assigning tasks to the Comptroller General. As the next section of
this article will develop, the usurpation required to offend separation ideals can and
should be decided without reference to any abstract characterization of the Comptroller
General's Gramm-Rudman-Hollings responsibilities. Indeed, as has often been the case,
Congress could have constitutionally vested legislative, executive, and judicial powers in
the Comptroller General under Gramni-Rudman-Hollings. 175
The majority's characterization of the Comptroller General's duties is reminiscent
of Chadha in which Chief Justice Burger simply asserted that the one-house legislative
veto was a "legislative" act because it altered "the legal rights, duties, and relations of
169 See Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 104 (1890) (naval officer appointed to office for
definite time did not have claim under any contract right when Congress abolished his office by
statute).
170 See L. FISHER, Supra note 157, at 95.
0 ' 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
172 See Kendall v. United States ex. rel Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 523 (1838).
"3 U.S. CoNs.r., art. 11, § 3.
171 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137; Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524. The Article 11 section 3
charge that the President "Shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed" is not a direction
to the President to carry out the laws. If Congress creates an independent office and directs that
the officer's judgment shall be final on a given matter, once the officer "faithfully executes" the
assignment, the President's duty ends.
175 The prototypical modern regulatory administrative agency acts in legislative, executive, and
judicial capacities in carrying out its delegated task. Such delegations are routinely upheld. See, e.g.,
National Cable Television Ass'it v. United States, 415 U,S. 336 (1974); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892).
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persons ... outside the Legislative Branch."I 76 In Chadha, the Chief Justice could at least
work from the presumption that the legislature's task is to legislate. Even so, his char-
acterization of the veto in Chadha was essentially an unsupported assertion, exposed by
the fact that all three branches act routinely to alter the legal rights of persons outside
the legislative branch.
Similarly, the attempt at finding fault with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings by character-
izing the nature of the Comptroller General's task as executive lacks support. Justice
Stevens exposed the weakness of the majority's reasoning on this point in his concurring
opinion. 177 Justice Stevens agreed that the Comptroller General is "not merely a clerk
wearing a 'green eye shade.'' 178 Justice Stevens also reasoned that the Comptroller
General's powers "must be recognized as having transcendent importance." 179 But not
all important government tasks are executive in nature. Justice Stevens referred to Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Myers v. United State.s: 18'' "The separation of powers of government
did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure,
dependent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects,
functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial." 181 Thus, the Constitution
contemplates the futility of abstract characterizations of government power. In Justice
Stevens' words: "a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of
the office to which it is assigned."'"! Under the provisions of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
in the event that the Comptroller General's role in reporting to the President is declared
unconstitutional, the Congress declared that the very same report would be prepared
by Congress itself under the Act's so-called "fallback provision."'" Even though such a
report would have precisely the same legal effect as a report issued by the Comptroller
176 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
17
 See Bowsher, _U.S. at	 106 S. Ct. at 3200 (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
", Id. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3199 (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
179
	 at	 106 S. Ct. at 3200 (Stevens & Marshall, jj., concurring).
' 80
 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
' 81
 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3200 (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (quoting Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, j., dissenting)).
In Id. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3200.
18' Section 274(f) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 provides,
in part:
Alternative Procedures for the Joint Reports of the Directors. —
(1)In the event that any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are
invalidated, then any report of the Directors referred to in section 251(a) or (c)(1)
shall be transmitted to the joint committee established under this subsection.
(2)Upon the invalidation of any such procedure there is established a Temporary
Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, composed of the entire membership of the
Budget Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate .... The
purposes of the Joint Committee are to receive the reports of the directors as
described in paragraph (1), and to report (with respect to each such report of the
Directors) a joint resolution as described in paragraph (3).
(3)No later than 5 days after the receipt of a report of the Directors in accordance
with paragraph (1), the Joint Committee shall report m the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate a joint resolution setting forth the contents of the report
of the Directors.
(5)Upon its enactment, the joint resolution shall be deemed to be the report
received by the President under section 251(b) or (c)(2) (whichever is applicable).
Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 274(f), 99 Stat. 1038, 1100.
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General, the Congress obviously would be performing a "legislative" task. 184 Thus, in
Bowsher, Justice Stevens found that "the function at issue is 'executive' if performed by
the Comptroller General but 'legislative' if performed by the Congress."'" If Congress
may delegate the powers at issue — and neither the district court nor the majority
doubted the validity of the delegation 186 — any attempt thereafter to characterize them
breaks down. The relevant question is whether the Comptroller General is exercising
power that the Constitution vests in the President, not whether the Comptroller General's
power is "executive," or as Justice Stevens argued, is instead "legislative."'"
Further, the majority's conclusion that no agency independent of presidential control
could "exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the flawrm is
flatly contradicted by several Supreme Court decisions since 1935, none of which was
overruled in Bowsher. 189 The Comptroller General's duties under Gramm-Rudman-Holl-
ings, even accepting the majority's description of them as involving "interpretation of
the law" and "application of the law" to facts, 199 are the quintessential functions which
independent commissions have performed regularly.' 9 '
3. Minor premise (part two): The Comptroller General is an agent of Congress
because he is removable by Congress.
According to the Bowsher majority, the removal provision in the 1921 Budget and
Accounting Act is the "critical factor" demonstrating that the Comptroller General is
subservient to Congress.' 92 Although the President appoints the Comptroller General,
the Comptroller General may be removed "only at the initiative of Congress" 193 through
a joint resolution for various listed causes. 194 After quoting selected statements from the
legislative history of the 1921 Act which suggest that the legislators intended removability
to insure that the Comptroller General owed his fealty to Congress,'" the majority found
that the grounds for removal under the statute "are very broad," 199 and are capable of
sustaining removal of a Comptroller General "for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the legislative will." 197 Finally, in addition to the "here and now
subservience"' 98 of the Comptroller General imposed by the removal provision, the Chief
Justice asserted that "lilt is clear that Congress consistently viewed the Comptroller
194 See Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3201 (Stevens & Marshall, 11., concurring).
1N5 Id.
"" See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
157 See Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3201 (Stevens Sc Marshall, Jj., concurring).
LH' Id. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
1 B9 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 481 U.S. 683 (1974); Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958).
1 " Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
'"' See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Executor v. United
States, 205 U.S. 602 (1935). But see Myers v, United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (the purely executive
function or the Postmaster did not require independence from the executive).
192 Bowsher, _U.S. at	 106 S. Ct. at 3189. See also 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1).
195 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3189.
1114 The statutory causes are: permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or
a felony or conduct involving moral turpitude. See 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1).
195 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3190.
196 ,rd,
[97 a
198 Id. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3193-94.
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General as an officer of the Legislative Branch."'" The Court alleged that the Comp-
troller General shares this view. 200
Inexplicably, the majority misstated the impact of the removability provision on the
Comptroller General's independence and mischaracterized the actual working relation-
ship between the Comptroller General and the legislative and executive branches of
government. First, the President participates in any removal decision affecting the Comp-
troller General by signing the joint resolution or exercising his veto. If the President
vetoes the resolution, two-thirds of the Congress must vote to override. The two-thirds
requirement for a congressional override is more demanding than the requirement for
impeachment and conviction."' Thus, it is unlikely that Congress acting alone would
remove a sitting Comptroller General. 9U2 Second, as Justices Stevens and White pointed
out, the bases for removal listed in the 1921 Act, along with a pre-removal hearing and
post-removal judicial review, operate to limit significantly congressional control over the
Comptroller General."3 In addition, no one contended that Congress has ever removed,
or threatened to remove, the Comptroller General."'
The Court's reliance on congressional removability to deny the independence of the
Comptroller General flies in the face of the Court's 1935 decision in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States,205 a decision left undisturbed by the Bowsher Court. By statute, the
President has the power to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office," 206 which are comparable to the
bases for congressional removal of the Comptroller General. In Humphrey's Executor,
President Roosevelt removed an uncooperative FTC commissioner before his term ex-
pired without asserting the statutorily required conditions. Yet no one contended in
Humphrey's Executor that presidential removability threatened the FTC's status as inde-
pendent of the President."' Indeed, the Court emphasized the Commission's indepen-
dence from the President when it sustained congressional restrictions on presidential
removal. 208
 Thus, the Court unequivocally endorsed the independent agency in 1935.
1 99 Id. at	 106 S. Ct. at 3191.
2"" Id. The majority asserted: "Over the years, the Comptrollers General have also viewed
themselves as part of the Legislative Branch." Id.
2"1 Impeachment requires a majority vote in the House in approving the Articles of Impeach-
ment and a two thirds vote of members present in the Senate to obtain a conviction. See U.S.
CoNsT., art. I, §§ 2-3. For a comparison of the relative difficulty of impeachment and veto override
see Bowsher, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 3193 n.I0 (White, J., dissenting.)
2412 See H. MANSFIELD, supra note 50, at 75-76; F. MOSHER, supra note 11, at 242 ("Barring
resignation, death, physical or mental incapacity, or extremely bad behavior, the Comptroller
General is assured his tenure if he wants it .. ..").
202 Bowsher, _U.S. at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3213-14 (White, J., dissenting); id. at _, 106 S. Ct. 3194-
95 (Stevens & Marshall, J J., concurring).
204
 Indeed, Justice Blackmun maintained that because the Congress had not sought removal of
the Comptroller General in Bowsher, plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief requested. Id. at _,
106 S. Ct. at 3215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated: "However wise or foolish it
may he, [the Deficit Control Act] unquestionably ranks among the most important federal enact-
ments of the past few decades. I cannot see the sense of invalidating legislation of this magnitude
in order to preserve a cumbersome, 65-year-old removal power that has never been exercised and
appears to have been all but forgotten until this litigation." Id.
205 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
2°6 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982).
947 See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631-32.
208 See id.
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"Control" of administration is one of Congress's most important roles. 2 "9 Congress
exercises its "control" of administration through legislation that regularly imposes sub-
stantive limitations on an "officer of the United States" regardless of the officer's place-
ment inside or outside the executive branch. Such exercise of power is clearly constitu-
tional." The removal provision in the 1921 -Act simply contains one set of substantive
constraints on the Comptroller General's discretion, complementary to—and less threat-
ening than — other limits which Congress may impose: "reducing the Comptroller's
salary, cutting the funds available to his department, reducing his personnel, limiting or
expanding his duties, or even abolishing his position altogether." 2 "
Nor is it true that an officer that is required by statute to perform duties for the
Congress becomes an agent of Congress for separation of powers purposes. While the
Comptroller General prepares reports and performs other tasks for Congress," he also
performs tasks for the President: dictating an executive agency's accounting techniques,
for example, and auditing federal spending. 2 ' 3 Statutes obligate officers ranging from
the President to the independent Federal Trade Commissioners to provide reports to
Congress. 2 " Further, unlike the Director of the Congressional Budget Office — who is
appointed by Congress — the Comptroller General is an officer of the United States,
appointed by the President." In terms of any agency relationship with Congress, the
Comptroller General is similar to a Federal Trade Commissioner: both are presidential
appointees performing tasks "in aid of the - legislative power."286
In short, "[Of Congress in 1921 wished to make the Comptroller General its lackey,
it did a remarkably poor job." 217 The removal provision requires "the procedural equiv-
alent of a new public law." 218 Consistent with congressional intent, the removal provision
is not only tightly controlled and unlikely ever to be exercised, but it is less effective in
directing the Comptroller General than many other devices available to the Congress."
In keeping with the long American tradition of insulating fiscal decisionmaking from
short-term political wrangling, 220 the Comptroller General was created to be, and has
always been, independent from the President and the Congress.22 ' Accordingly, the
Comptroller General and not the CBO or OMB was assigned the reporting functions
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings because Congress sought to create "a wall . . . that takes
the decisions out of the hands of the President and the Congress. "222 The fact that four
2"" See generally L. FISHER, supra note 157 at 100-23.
21" See id.
tlawsher,	 106 S. Ct. at 3212 (White, J., dissenting).
212 See id, at _, 106 S. Ct. at 3197-98.
2111 See id, at ___, 106 S. Ct. at 3198.
214 See id. at __, 106 S. Cr. at 3213 n.13 (White, J., dissenting); id. at._ 106 S. Ct. at 3215-16
n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215 compare 2 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1982) (Director of the Congressional Budget Office appointed
by Speaker of House of Representatives and President pro tempore of the Senate) with 31 U.S.C.
§ 703(a)(1) (Comptroller General appointed by the President).
216 See U.S. CoNsr. art. II, 2, cL 2; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,122 (1976).
2" Bowsher, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. at 3219 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215 Id,
219 See supra notes 1 57 and 169 and accompanying text.
22° See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
221 See F. Mosinat, supra note I I, at 240-44.
222
 131 Colic. REC. 149846 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Gephardt) (emphasis
added).
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members of the Supreme Court recognized the fallacy of equating removability with
subservience is small solace. 223
V. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS DOES NOT VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Court in Bowsher conceded that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does not violate any
specific constitutional prohibition. 224 Rather, the assignment of the Act's reporting func-
tions to the Comptroller General was found to violate the separation of powers because
of the Comptroller General's "here and now subservience" to Congress manifested in
the 1921 removal provision.225 The Court's conclusion, however, misinterprets separation
of powers in three basic ways. First, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in no way threatened the
checking arrangements which the Constitution embodies to further the Framers' sepa-
ration ideals. Second, the Constitution does not contemplate a rigid separation of powers.
Even accepting the unlikely characterization of Chief Justice Burger that the Congress
was somehow involved in executing the law, a proper interpretation of the role of a
system of separation of powers in our government tolerates a sharing of powers in the
ongoing accommodations among the elected branches. Third, those few instances where
the Court has embraced an idea of separation that requires a rigid division of powers
have concerned clear violations of a specific limitation in the text of the Constitution.
These cases, however, did not call for application of a rigid model of separation to the
Bowsher challenge.
A. Gramm -Rudman -Hollingi Did Not Threaten the Checking Mechanisms in the Constitution
Part I of this article described the tradition of governmental efforts to assure that
spending decisions are made by legislative bodies.226 These efforts sought to insure the
broadest possible scope of citizen accountability, and to free spending decisions from
political influences, because of' feared corruption. As Part I reveals, the best answer to
the claim that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violates separation of power precepts is that
Congress and its delegees were doing just what such a tradition, embodied in our
Constitution, contemplates. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is quintessentially legislative. With
its imperfections, Congress remains the only institution capable of making spending
decisions which are accountable to the public. 227
Today, the Comptroller General serves as an important check on presidential im-
poundment and procurement. 229 His role throughout our history has been similar to
and consistent with his central contemporary role in helping Congress insulate spending
decisions from political control pursuant to the requirement in Article I that "No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law." 229 Prior to the Constitution, both the Continental Congress and the Parliament
223 The four are Justices Stevens, Marshall, White, and Blackmun.
221 See Bowsher, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. at 3194 ("We conclude 	 that the powers vested in the
Comptroller General ... violate the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no role
in the execution of the laws."); id. at 106 S. Ct. at 3184 ("The question ... is whether [the Act]
... violates the doctrine of separation of powers.")
223 Id. at	 106 S. Ct. at 3193-94.
226 See supra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
227 See Frug, supra note 73, at 739-40.
226 See F. MOSHER, supra note 11, at 304-06.
226 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cI. 7.
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had established independent commissioners to exercise the comptroller function. 230
Then, during the First Congress in 1789, Madison successfully argued that cabinet
officials, such as the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs, should be removable at the
will of the President."' A week later, however, when the First Congress discussed the
Treasury Department—and specifically the comptroller — Madison opined that because
the duties of the office were not purely executive — but partook of a judicial quality as
well — a different rule in respect of executive removal might well apply. 232
The Supreme Court has endorsed distinctions of the kind drawn by Madison since
1803. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall noted his support for the First
Congress's determination that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs served at the pleasure of
the President. 233 But for Marbury, the plaintiff in the case who had been appointed for
a five-year term as justice of the peace, the Court declared a different status: "as the law
creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five years, independent of the
executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights, which
are protected by the laws of his country." 234 Accordingly, the Court recognized that
Congress may create statutorily an office independent of unlettered presidential control.
Thus, the nineteenth century Supreme Court harmonized with the Congress's wishes
and the Framers' desire for an independent Comptroller. 233
A crisis occured around the beginning of this century which served to cement the
independence of the Comptroller. President Cleveland threatened to remove a Comp-
troller for declining to follow an opinion of the Attorney Genera1. 296 The threat accom-
plished its desired purpose: Congress sought to repair the Comptroller's independence
when it considered the various budget reform measures of 1919 to 1921. 23 ' Indeed, in
the eventual bill which transferred the Comptroller of the Treasury's functions to the
Comptroller General — and added investigative and reporting duties to its prior auditing
responsibilities — Congress was so determined to ensure that the new Comptroller
General be independent that it provided for no presidential role in removal of the
Comptroller Genera1. 2" The hill required instead a concurrent resolution by the two
Houses of Congress. 239 When President Wilson vetoed the bill because of the removability
provision, Congress substituted the present joint resolution requirement. The President
signed the revised bill without objection. 24 °
The 1926 Supreme Court decision in Myers v. United States"' temporarily threatened
the reestablished independence of the Comptroller General. The Myers Court held that
the President could remove at will officers with purely executive functions, such as Mr.
04 See McGuire, Legislative or Executive Control Over Accounting for Federal Funds, 20 ILL. L. REV.
455, 466-68 (1926).
231 See F. MOSHER, supra note 11, at 22-27; see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 111-31
(1926).
232 1 ANNALS or CONG. 611-12 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
2" See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66.
234 See id. at 162.
235 See St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Ry. v. United States, 268 U.S. 169, 174 (1925); United
States v. Harmon, 147 U.S. 268 (1893).
239 See H. MANSFIELD, supra note 50, at 60 & n.97.
257 See id.
258 See 59 CONG. REC. 8609 (1920).
259 Id.
246 This episode is recounted in F. MOSHER, supra note 11, at 47-57.
241 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
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Myers the postmaster. Although this holding was consistent with past opinion and the
Framers' understanding, in dicta former President and Chief Justice Taft asserted that
removal at will was appropriate even for a comptroller. 2" 2 Because he saw that his view
was inconsistent with Marbiliy v. Madison, Chief Justice Taft sought to overrule that
aspect of Marbtoy. 242
The force of Taft's dicta in Myers lasted only until 1935 when the Humphrey's Executor
Court expressly rejected it, based upon Marbuly and Madison's statement in the 1789
Congress.244 Humphrey's Executor's central premise was that officers intended by Congress
to carry out quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial tasks could be made independent and free
from removal at will by the President."" The Humphrey's Executor decision, therefore,
reaffirmed the independence of the Comptroller General, which was not doubted until
Bowsher.
Prior to Bowsher, President Nixon's runaway presidential impoundments posed the
most recent threat to congressional primacy on fiscal matters. 2.0 During that episode,
the President repeatedly ignored appropriations which had broad popular support. Until
1974, Congress had no device for controlling presidential impoundments, although the
courts overwhelmingly decided against presidential power in cases challenging specific
impoundments."' In response to President Nixon's actions, the Congress passed the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 248 The 1979 Act explicitly
denies the President the discretion to impound appropriated funds without congressional
approval.249 In light of the adverse court decisions, the President did not challenge the
new limits on his power to alter spending decisions. Thus, the Congress reclaimed a
portion of its Article I fiscal power which it had allowed to slip away. Because Congress
arrived at Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in exercise of its undisputed Article I powers, and
because Congress relied on the independent Comptroller General to perform the re-
porting functions in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings — which is entirely consistent with the
role envisioned by the Framers — neither Gramm-Rudman-Hollings itself nor the lim-
itation on the Comptroller General's removal contained in the 1921 Budget Act violate
the separation of powers.
B. The Constitution Does Not Contemplate a Rigid Separation of Powers
It is too soon to tell whether Gramm-Rudman-Hollings will be effective. Many have
charged that it is a foolish trick or, worse yet, an effort at deficit reduction with mirrors
which is doomed to fail. 25° Others have noted that deficits are falling, perhaps because
212 See id. at 135.
2" See id. at 139-41.
411 Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-32 (1935).
315 Id. at 628. Moreover the Court recently recognized with perfect consistency that "[t]he GAO
is an independent agency within the Legislative Branch that exists in large part to serve the needs
of Congress." Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824. 844 (1983).
246 The episode is described in J. SUNDQUIST, Supra note 90, at 201-09. A possible exception is
the role of the President and the Director of the OMB in pressing a fiscal agenda before Congress
in 1981. See L. FISHER, supra note 157, at 231.
24 ' See J. SUNDQUIST supra note 90, at 201-09.
24' 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1982).
249 2 U.S.C. § 683 (1982).
25° See, e.g., Congressional Quarterly, Nov. 15, 1986, at 2879-82.
July 1987]	 JUDICIALIZATION OF THE FISC 	 685
of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 251 These issues, however, are irrelevant to the constitu-
tional inquiry. To be sure, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was a dramatic measure, and a
bold experiment in fiscal management that sought to attack directly what has become
an intractable and alarmingly serious national problem. But the Constitution wisely leaves
the resolution of such matters to the political branches which pass laws and budgets. 252
The few fundamental truths about our Constitution and the separation of powers
have been thoroughly documented. 253 The text of the Constitution describes the powers
of the principal government institutions in discrete Articles, but it does not otherwise
impose a separation requirement. The absence of more explicit reference to separation
in the Constitution is explainable in light of the fact that separation of powers itself is
an unmatched set of ideas encompassing elements of mixed government, shared powers,
and checks and balances. 254 Not surprisingly, separation meant different things to dif-
ferent people in .America in the 1780's. Indeed, in the 1780's checks and balances
supplanted separation as an ideal, 255 and this phenomenon was translated into the text
of the Constitution. 256 Further, to the extent that separation of powers did animate the
Constitution, three dominant versions of, or reasons for, separation can be, and were,
supported: to insure against tyranny, to promote the government's legitimacy, and to
further governmental efficiency. 257 Because these separation theories may be in compe-
tition in a given dispute, the Court sometimes has spoken as if only one theory of
separation exists. 255 For example, in some cases the Court's assertion that separation was
intended first and foremost to protect against tyranny supports a result that could have
as readily been reached directly through the constitutional text. 25° Unfortunately, the
Bowsher Court dragged out its one-dimensional version of separation of powers to in-
validate Gramm-Rudman-Hollings where there was no constitutional violation.
The archaic view of the separation of powers as requiring three air-tight departments
of government has no place in our jurisprudence, 260 particularly when the dispute is
among the elected branches and concerns a matter having no direct bearing on important
individual rights. 261 Instead, a separation inquiry should focus on the extent to which
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its con-
stitutionally assigned functions," 262 or it should focus on whether the removability of the
Comptroller General in the context of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings constitutes a genuine
251 See, e.g., Congressional Quarterly, Oct. 2$,1986,2255-56.
2" See generally Frug, supra note 73.
2" See generally W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF , THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); M. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine
of "The Separation of Powers", 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935).
254 See G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 109 (1981).
255 See sources cited supra note 253.
25" See Banks, supra note 162, at 722.
257 See id. at 720-23.
256
	 id. at 723-26.
259 See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 962 U.S. 919 (1983) (presentment); Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Article III); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(Appointment Clause); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (Bill of Attainment); Meyers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Appointment Clause).
20°
	
v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 52,425,443 (1977),
261 See generally Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L, REV. 1031 (1985);
Frug, supra note 73.
R62 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443.
686	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 28:659
threat of "encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other."m The earlier parts of this article demonstrate that no such threat or usurpation
is present in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme because the removal provision in the
1921 Act renders the Comptroller General independent rather than subservient to either
Congress or the President. 264
In short, whether or not Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is good policy, it is not uncon-
stitutional. Congress passed the Act to carry out its constitutionally assigned power of
the purse. Congress's delegation of reporting functions to the Comptroller General, an
"officer" appointed by the President under Article II, was "necessary and proper" to the
exercise of this power. The Bowsher Court should have looked for the existence of a
threat or usurpation of executive branch powers. Because Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
took nothing from the Executive which is constitutionally assigned to it, there is no
separation of powers violation.
C. Buckley, Northern Pipeline, and Chadha Do Not Require Invalidation of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings
In Bowsher, no one argued that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated any explicit con-
stitutional prohibition. Rather, the Bowsher majority argued an ill-reasoned extension of
the Myers dicta that the President's power to remove is implicit and is incident to his
Article II powers of appointment. In the few earlier cases which applied the rigid
separation model to invalidate an act of Congress, each Act was found to violate clear
and unambiguous textual commands in the Constitution. For example, in the 1976 case
of Buckley v. Valeo, the Court found that Congress ran afoul of the Appointments Clause
itself when it sought to appoint members of the Federal Election Commission. 265 Then,
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the Court held that Con-
gress, in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, sought to confer judicial power on bankruptcy
judges in conflict with the clear direction of Article III that all "judicial power" be
exercised by life-tenured judges. 266 Finally, in I.N.S. v. Chadha, the Court found that the
legislative veto of an I.N.S. suspended deportation order violated the explicit require-
ments of bicameralism and presentment in Article 1. 267
265 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 122.
254
 As Justice White stated in his Bowsher dissent:
The power over removal retained by the Congress is not a power that is exercised
outside the legislative process as established by the Constitution, nor does it appear
likely that it is a power that adds significantly to the influence Congress may exert
over executive officers through other, undoubtedly constitutional exercises of legisla-
tive power and through the constitutionally guaranteed impeachment power. Indeed,
the removal power is so constrained by its own substantive limits and by the require-
ment of presidential approval "that, as a practical matter, Congress has not exercised,
and probably will never exercise, such control over the Comptroller General that his
non-legislative powers will threaten the goal of dispersion of power, and hence the
goal of individual liberty, that separation of powers serves."
Bowsher, _U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. at 3213-14 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Ameron, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 895 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concurring in part)),
265
 424 U.S. at 124-37.
266 458 U.S. at 57-62.
267 462 U.S. at 944-59.
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The Myers dicta concerning removal power incident to the Appointments Clause 268
is not controlling in view of Marburg v. Madison and Humphrey's Executor. Moreover, the
Bowsher Court in no way disavowed either Marburg or Humphrey's• Executor. In short, the
Appointments Clause has never by itself been held to prohibit Congress from condition-
ing removability when it enacts the laws creating and defining all offices riot provided
for in the Constitution.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings does not violate any other grant of executive power in
Article II. The Court has not construed the general grant of "executive power" in Article
II to confer some undefined host of executive prerogatives not elsewhere listed in the
text. 269 Further the requirement that the Executive shall "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"27° serves to limit the Executive and certainly does not grant power
for the President over independent officials. As Justice Holmes stated: "The duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his powers." 21 '
CONCLUSIONS
The Court's misdirected effort at hemming in what the majority saw as a separation
of powers violation by Congress simply may be clue to the Court's demonstrated poor
understanding of spending and the budget process. Thus the Court may have set its
own trap in Bowsher — a fiscal thicket. To be sure, the budget process has become a most
complex and convoluted exercise. But the Court could have avoided the fiscal thicket
had it properly applied separation of powers principles and its own precedents. Instead,
the Court wallowed in a sea of misconceptions about the nature of the GAO and the
Comptroller General, their relationship to other government actors, and the duties
charged to the Comptroller General under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Instead of con-
Zee U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 2, el. 2. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 164.
269
	
II, Section 1 of the Constitution states: "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." U.S. Coms•r. art. I I, § 1. Justice Jackson summarized
the limited scope of this language:
If [the clause granted such powers], it is difficult to see why the forefathers bothered
to add several specific items [to Article II], including some trilling ones.
The example of . , . unlimited executive power that must have most impressed
the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of
its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating
their new Executive in his image .... 1 cannot accept the view that this clause is a
grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power ....
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 570,640-41 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concurring).
27e
	 CONST. art. IL
2" Myers, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, j. dissenting). Ironically, the Court shunned the rigid
separation model in another decision announced the same day as Bowsher. In Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, ___, 146 S. Ct. 3245 (1986), the Court held that the CFTC's
adjudication of counter claims did not violate Article Ill's vesting of judicial power in the federal
courts. Id. at .._, 146 S. Ct. at 3261. As an independent agency created by Congress in 1974, CFTC
promulgated a rule in 1976 allowing it to decide a broker's counterclaim to a customer's claim
against the broker for violating the Commodity Exchange Act. In upholding the Commission, the
Court refused to apply "formalistic and unbending rules" to decide whether separation of powers
had been violated, because such an approach could constrict "unduly" Congress's ability to take
needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article 1 powers. Id. at 106 S. Ct. at 3258. Instead,
the Court focused on "the practical cheer that the congressional action will have on the constitu-
tionally assigned role of the federal judiciary." Id. at 106 S. Ct. at 3255-56.
688	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 (Vol. 28:659
ceding the complexities of budgeting and deferring to the expertise and accountability
of the elected branches in making spending decisions, 272
 the Court sometimes pretended
that the complexities were not there, sometimes simply misstated how budgeting works,
and decided Bowsher on the basis of a never-exercised removal provision that had, at
best, tangential relevance to the new Act.
Unfortunately, the Court rushed to decide the Bowsher challenge before anyone had
a chance to see how the key participants in budgeting would react to the deficit reduction
goals. Perhaps the goals would be met by new-found restraint on the part of Congress
and the executive branch. The automatic reduction mechanism was intended as a pro-
cedure never to be used, but whose presence Congress determined essential to attain
the deficit reduction objectives. 2" A member of the Senate Budget Committee remarked
that the Congress will act to avoid the automatic mechanism "because the penalties for
inaction will be so great, and the demands for a creative and sensitive response will be
correspondingly great."271 If the goals are not met, additional time would have permitted
a record to emerge from the CBO-OMB-GAO reporting required under the automatic
reduction process. Surely, just what the Comptroller General does under the Act would
then be more clear. Additional budgeting under the Act would no doubt have further
highlighted the unimportance of the 1921 removal provision both to the Comptroller
General's behavior and to the operation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. It is true Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings is still functioning. Perhaps Bowsher's impact on budgeting will be
minimal. There remains an unfolding budgeting scenario which has as its goal deficit
reduction. Short term budget outcomes aside, however, the Bowsher decision could sig-
nificantly impact the long term goal of insulating some fiscal decisions from political
influence.
That the Supreme Court is not expert in budgeting is hardly surprising. Indeed,
there is no reason to ask the judiciary to become students of the budgeting process. Even
if it were desirable for judges to understand the budgeting process, courts are not
institutionally equipped for such a role. While the Constitution does not permit the
judicial branch to decline constitutional questions when properly presented, 275 institu-
tional limitations — as well as separation of powers principles and democratic theory —
command that such a judicial role be limited and deferential to the political branches. 276
Until Bowsher, the Supreme Court had not deviated from its deference to the political
branches in matters of domestic policymaking except when an explicit constitutional
prohibition had arguably been violated. In Bowsher, the Court entered the fiscal thicket
without such a constitutional prohibition in hand and disserved all of us: our elected
officials who are seeking to lower the budget deficit, the courts which must try to place
the poorly reasoned decision in a line of cases into which it does not fit, and the people,
who learn that bold efforts to trim the budget deficit do not comport with the Consti-
tution. Meanwhile, the deficit remains and we all suffer the consequences.
272 See, e.g., Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. Gni. L. REV. 307,
325-26 (1976).
273 See 131 CONG. REC. S12,574 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Gorton).
274 Id.
275 See, e.g., Redish, supra note 261, at 1059-61.
276 See generally Fmk supra note 73.
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